Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp. 213 F.3d 124 (3^rd Cir. 2000)-Holmes and Hollyfield successfully prosecuted a civil action against the Bethlehem Steel pension plan for interest on pension benefits.  The plan had delayed paying the benefits for a decade and a half.  Here, however, they argue that the District Court erred by:  "(1) awarding interest at the statutory rate rather than requiring the Plan to disgorge the actual profits it earned on their delayed benefits; (2) concluding that the doctrine of laches applied to limit the period for which they could recover interest; (3) denying certification of their proposed plaintiff classes; and (4) concluding that the legal memorandum they sought to discover was entitled to work-product immunity."

On the first issue, this court found that plaintiffs' argument misinterpreted its decision in Fotta v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers of Am. Health & Retirement Fund, 165 F.3d 209 (3^rd Cir. 1998).  That case presented two primary justifications for awarding interest on delayed benefit payments—ensuring full compensation to the plaintiff, and preventing unjust enrichment.  This court found it appropriate under this rationale to award interest based on the Treasury Bill yield or some other "minimal standard rate."  Higher yield interest would be based on risk borne by the company, and the question of whether plaintiff would have bought higher-yield investments is too speculative.  Furthermore, preventing unjust enrichment simply means enrichment at the beneficiaries expense, and does not require punitive damages to take back profits—especially where there is no showing of intentional misconduct.

            On the second point, this court remanded, finding that the District Court failed to make the necessary findings for application of laches.  Under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of laches has two elements:  (1) inexcusable delay; and (2) prejudice.  The court could not limit plaintiffs' recovery of interest to the six-year period of the statute of limitations without satisfying the elements of laches.

            Third, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiffs' request for class certification.  Among other flaws, the requested classes were overbroad, and the proposed representatives' claims were moot at the time they moved for class certification.

           Lastly, this court reversed the order denying Appellants' request for production of a certain memorandum that Bethlehem attorneys had prepared.  The District Court erred by summarily stating or assuming that it was work product "prepared in anticipation of possible future litigation" without the defendant making any such showing.