Carugati v. The Long Term Disability Plan For Salaried Employees

 

 

Carugati v. The Long Term Disability Plan For Salaried Employees, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4774  (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21 , 2002 )[1]

 

Carugati's treating physician diagnosed Carugati with fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome. 

Despite applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review the court found the denial of benefits to be arbitrary and capricious.

The court noted that through its own terms, the Hartford plan grounded its definition of disability on a participant's ability to function in employment. However, the plan's determination on Carugati's benefits eligibility failed to discuss Carugati's potential for employment, or whether Carugati could become qualified for employment through training or education.  The court found that the plan completely failed to address Carugati's ability to perform any job in the national economy and the skills necessary to perform that job. The Hartford plan based its definition of disability on the ability to engage in employment. Hartford’s doctor, Dr. George Kazda's report did not address Carugati's ability to engage in employment. The plan did not submit vocational evidence that Carugati could find employment with her physical limitations or could be qualified for employment through training or education. Nor did the plan address Carugati's employment capability in its letter to Carugati terminating her benefits.

The court found that not only did the plan fail to analyze Carugati's physical limitations that could prevent employment, it neglected to consider Carugati's age, work history, and skills.

In addition to the plan's failure to assess Carugati's ability to function and engage in employment, the plan failed to analyze sufficiently the record evidence. 

The court also found, as significant that none of Hartford’s medical reports opined on Carugati's diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome or fibromyalgia.

The court noted that Dr. Kazda’s conclusions on Carugati’s condition were unclear.  Dr. Kazda's medical report suggested Carugati never suffered from CFS or fibromyalgia.  Dr. Kazda's only support for that conclusion is a one-line comment there "is no clear substantiation in the record of either chronic fatigue syndrome or fibromyalgia."  Dr. Kazda arrived at this conclusion without conducting any physical examinations or medical tests on Carugati.  Dr. Kazda's report failed to discuss the record evidence that formed the basis for that conclusion.  The court determined that Dr. Kazda and the plan's conclusion was inconsistent with its continuous payment of disability benefits to Carugati for nine years.  Dr. Kazda's opinion of Carugati's condition in October 2000 was based on medical reports that are over five years old.  Further, the plan made its determination on the opinion of one non-treating, non-examining physician, who was the plan's associate medical director. 

Dr. Papernik, Carugati's treating physician, diagnosed her with chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia from 1991 to 2000.  The court noted that Dr. Kazda summarily dismissed Dr. Papernik's diagnosis by stating his examination showed no significant abnormalities and was based on Carugati's subjective statements.  The plan and Dr. Kazda failed to evaluate Carugati's ability to engage in employment, which constituted the plan's definition of disability. Dr. Kazda did not address Dr. William Hilger's opinion that Carugati experienced a significant decline in cognitive ability, general knowledge, calculational ability and abstract reasoning.

The court noted that its plan's second basis for denying benefits -- the video surveillance tape -- only demonstrated that Carugati can walk her dog for several minutes during the day and climb a small step ladder.  The video surveillance did not shed light on Carugati's ability to function at a full-time job.  Under the Hartford plan, total disability is not equated with a plan participant's inability to walk, care for oneself, or perform routine daily functions but a participant's inability to engage in employment.  The court found that Dr. Kazda's conclusion that the video surveillance was in "marked contrast" with Carugati's statements about her condition was inaccurate.  The court noted that Carugati's ability to walk her dog several minutes a day and climb a few rungs of a small stepladder once do not automatically render a conclusion that she was lying or misrepresenting her condition.  The court noted that the plan relied on Dr. Kazda's speculative conclusion that "long term secondary gain appears to be a major motivating factor in this case."  Dr. Kazda formed that conclusion without examining or interviewing Carugati.

The court found as significant that the plan's determination on Carugati's condition comes after the plan paid benefits to Carugati for nine years.  From 1991 to 2000, the Hartford plan conducted four evaluations of Carugati's condition but it continued benefits after each evaluation.  At the time the plan terminated benefits, the record was devoid of new medical evidence indicating a significant change in Carugati's condition.  The plan’s failures to address Caugati’s receipt of social security disability benefits for nine years, and continued to receive those benefits at the time the plan terminated long-term disability benefits also troubled the court.

The plan concluded Carugati was not disabled based on Dr. Kazda's brief report and an immaterial video surveillance tape. The plan chose not to conduct an independent medical examination, and it failed to sufficiently analyze the record evidence. Thus, the plan failed to make a rational connection between the evidence in the case and its conclusion to terminate benefits. The plan's termination of Carugati's benefits was arbitrary and capricious.

Unfortunately for Carugati the court did not order the plan to reinstate the benefits. Instead it rewarded Hartford for its Cavalier attitude in the claims process by remanding the claim to Hartford to do it right. Because this court remanded the matter to the plan administrator, Carugati was only "a prevailing party in some sense of the term" and was not entitled to attorney's fees at this point. The court found that Carugati failed to present evidence the plan's decision was in bad faith or was taken to harass Carugati by denying her disability benefits.



[1] Mark D. DeBofsky, Nathan Q Rugg, DeBofsky & DeBofsky, represented Carugati,. Donald Alan Murday, Elizabeth Gwynn Doolin, Craig Michael Bargher, Peterson & Ross, represented the plan  The Honorable Suzanne B. Conlon was the judge.