Proctor v UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1239 (8^th Cir. Jan. 29, 2002) (unpublished)

The Court agreed that UNUM did not abuse its discretion in denying benefits. See Delta Family-Care Disability & Survivorship Plan v. Marshall, 258 F.3d 834, 841 (8^th Cir. 2001)[1] TA \l "Delta Family-Care Disability & Survivorship Plan v. Marshall, 258 F.3d 834 (8^th Cir. 2001)" \s "Delta Family-Care Disability & Survivorship Plan v. Marshall" \c 1  (explaining that a plan administrator's decision to deny benefits must stand if it is reasonable, i.e., supported by relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the decision). After conducting similar tests with differing results, examining physicians Joseph Matthews and Deanna Ruddell reached opposite conclusions as to whether Proctor had a disabling allergy to latex. Thus, the court found it reasonable for UNUM to credit Dr. Matthews's opinion, based on two types of skin tests, an independently analyzed blood test, and a lung-function study. See Delta, 258 F.3d at 843 (ruling that a plan administrator does not abuse its discretion in finding employee not disabled where record reflects conflicting medical opinions). The Court said it was also reasonable for UNUM to decline to find Proctor disabled based on the January 2000 letter from her treating physician, Dr. Barger. Dr. Barge, in his letter, failed to specify which of the conditions he listed was disabling, or to explain how they prevented her from working as a radiologic technologist. The Court further noted that contrary to Proctor's assertion, the Plan specifically required that she be under the regular care of a physician for her allegedly disabling condition.

The Eighth Circuit also decided that Proctor's reliance on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) TA \l "Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)" \s "Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms" \c 1 , was misplaced. The Court stated that the key issue in an ERISA denial-of-benefits action was whether substantial evidence supported the plan administrator’s decision, although the plan administrator makes that determination in part by considering the quality of the evidence. See Fletcher-Merrit v. NorAm Energy Corp., 250 F.3d 1174, 1179 (8^th Cir. 2001) TA \l "Fletcher-Merrit v. NorAm Energy Corp., 250 F.3d 1174 (8^th Cir. 2001)" \s "Fletcher-Merrit v. NorAm Energy" \c 1 . In dicta the court said that even if Daubert applied, Proctor did not present her test-reliability argument to the Plan, so ERISA precluded the District Court from considering the argument and the medical literature upon which Proctor based the argument. See Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1251 (8^th Cir. 1998) TA \l "Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246 (8^th Cir. 1998)" \s "Layes v. Mead Corp." \c 1  ("Under the abuse of discretion standard, the reviewing court should consider only evidence that was before the plan administrator when the claim was denied.").